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Genetics and Artificial Procreation in the U.S.A.
Carl E. Schneider1 and Lynn D. Wardle 2

I

General information on the legal situation

We national reporters have been asked to provide in a few pages such a range of
information about the law and practice of medicine generally, genetic and artificial
reproductive techniques specifically, and related family law and human rights issues
that probably no country's reporter could pretend to have succeeded. We reporters
for the United States, particularly, must stress the limitations of our report at the
outset. It is difficult to summarize the American law and practice because they
are so extraordinarily various and dynamic. There are several reasons for this, most
of which will in uncanny ways confirm many of the foreign observer's preconceptions about American law.
First, American law and practice are various because American government
remains in important ways genuinely federal. Family law has traditionally been
confided to the fifty state governments, each of which is largely free to regulate
reproductive technologies as it wishes. Second, law and practice are various because
American government remains in important ways committed to the principle of
separation of powers. This means that the power to regulate those technologies
is divided among the various branches and agencies of the federal and the state
governments.
Third, law and practice are various because of a series of inhibitions on
governmental regulation of social life. It is well known, for example, that Americans
have historically had - and in telling ways retain - a generally laissez-faire, antidirigiste view of government's role. That orientation is reinforced by our common
law tradition. That tradition prefers a gradual rather than a pre-emptive legal
response to novel social problems in which courts deal with aspects of the problem
only as each aspect presents itself, waiting until the extent of the problem has
become apparent before attempting a broad solution to it. Yet further inhibiting
governmental regulation of reproductive technology is the power of rights thinking
and - more specifically - the specter of Roe v. Wade, 3 the controversial 1973 case
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Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215 USA. David Charnin, J.D. 1998, provided valuable research
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Professor of Law, Brigham Young University School of Law, Provo, UT 84602 USA. Julia
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in which the United States Supreme Court held that the states' power to regulate
abortions is severely constrained by women's constitutional right to make decisions
about reproduction. That decision provoked such intense and sustained criticism
of 'judicial legislation' that the Court has generally avoided taking the policymaking initiative in other cases involving controversial biomedical issues. 4
Nevertheless, the potential for Roe- like preemptive judicial action remains a
significant influence.
A.

General Principles of Medical Law

Medical law in the United States of America rests on three fundamental principles:
patient autonomy, public welfare, and professional competence. The first two
principles particularly influence the direct legal regulation of family-related genetic
engineering and artificial procreation in the United States. The last principle works
indirectly, through economic constraints associated with civil liability.
1.

Consent and privacy

Patient autonomy historically has been protected by the firmly established rule
that a physician must have his or her patient's consent before a treatment can be
administered. 5 Two separate doctrines of patient consent have developed: first,
traditional consent rooted in battery, and second, and most recently, informed
consent grounded in negligence. 6 The earliest and best-known statement of
traditional consent is from the 1914 New York case of Shloendorff v. New York
Hospital: 7 'Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body: and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages .... ' 8 A doctor who fails to obtain consent or who exceeds the scope
of consent commits the tort of battery, defined in the American common law as
'an intentional touching of, or use of force upon, another person without the
person's consent.' 9 If a patient has given consent, he or she may not later assert
a claim of battery. Informed consent theory provides a remedy when a medical
service provider fails to disclose the material risks or consequences of a treatment.
4
5
6
7
8
9
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See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 743 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical
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That failure deprives the patient of his or her right to give (or withhold) genuine
consent and constitutes negligence because it is deemed to fall below a reasonable
standard of expected professional conduct. As a court put it in the famous case
of Canterbury v. Spence:
The scope of the physician's communication to the patient must be measured
by the patient's need, and that need is the information material to the decision.
Thus, the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is
its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision
must be unmasked. 10
Under both doctrines, consent may be either express or implied. Treatment provided
in a bona fide medical emergency (when consent generally is presumed) is
protected.
The doctrine of informed consent today requires a competent patient 'to be
adequately informed of the nature and consequences of a particular medical
procedure, process, or treatment prior to giving consent for that treatment.' 11 Thus,
the doctrine generally requires doctors to adequately advise their competent patients
regarding (1) the problem or diagnosis, (2) the recommended intervention together
with its risks and benefits, (3) the expected result without intervention, and (4)
any alternative interventions together with their risks and benefits. 12
Informed consent is not required in three general situations - when (a) the
patient is threatened with serious harm or death if not treated immediately (the
emergency exception), or (b) the patient voluntarily gives up the right to be informed
and consents, in advance, to whatever action the physician considers appropriate,
or (c) the physician has strong reason to believe that disclosure itself would result
in serious physical or psychological harm to the patient (the therapeutic-privilege
exception). 13 Also, a doctor has no duty to advise patients as to matters of common
or actual know ledge. 14 As a general rule, a patient's 'competence should be
presumed unless sufficient reasons to the contrary are identified, e.g., gross mental
deficits or incapacity.' 15 If a court has determined that a patient is incompetent,
the patient's court-appointed guardian is authorized to give consent; otherwise,
the patient's closest known relative is generally allowed to give consent. 16 As a
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464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Legal Medicine, supra, at 198. See also Charles L. Spring & Bruce J. Winick, Informed Consent,
in Legal Aspects of Medicine 62-65 (James Vevaina, Roger C. Bone, Edwin Kassoff, eds, 1989).
See generally Informed Consent at 6; Legal Medicine at 200.
Informed Consent at 6; Legal Medicine at 202.
Informed Consent at 8. A lack of informed consent is negligence and is actionable only if
emotional or physical injuries result.
Informed Consent at 6; Legal Medicine at 200.
Legal Medicine at 200-01.
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matter of law, minors are legally presumed to be incompetent; thus '[t]he general
legal principle, although with numerous exceptions, is that a minor is incapable
of giving effective consent for the administration of medical treatment. The minor
is generally defined as someone below the age of eighteen or twenty-one. Therefore,
in most circumstances, a physician must obtain the consent of a parent or guardian
prior to embarking on the examination or treatment of a minor.' 17 However, by
statute many states have created exceptions to the parental-consent rule in order
to encourage minors to obtain prompt medical treatment in situations (such as
treatment for drug addiction, pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, etc.) when
parental disclosure might dissuade many teens from seeking medical care. Also,
minors may be deemed capable of giving consent during emergencies, if adjudicated
to be mature or medically emancipated and when it is physically impracticable
to obtain consent. 18
The ideals of autonomy and independence run deep in American culture.
Indeed, some bioethicists, doctors, and patients are even beginning to suggest that
patients not only have a right to make their own medical decision, but have a duty
to do so. They argue that patients who make their own decisions benefit medically
from becoming involved in their own care and that patients have a moral duty to
make for themselves the decisions that shape their lives. Some doctors add that
they are glad to be relieved of making momentous decisions for other people.
Nevertheless, empirical studies also reveal that a substantial number of patients
would rather not make their own medical decision. What is more, the sicker the
patient, the less likely he or she is to want to seize the reins of control. In addition,
it has become plain that, however hard doctors try to inform patients about their
illness, patients all too often take away from the encounter far less information
than they need to make informed decisions and retain too much misinformation
to make decisions really well. 19
In recent years, recognition of patients' legal right to refuse treatment has
underscored the principle of patient autonomy. While the United States Supreme
Court has rejected the claim that the Constitution requires states to permit assisted
suicide, 20 in a famous case involving withdrawal of life-support systems the Court
stated that '[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions.' 21 Patient autonomy as a fundamental substantive value has been
17
18
19
20
21
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Id.
Id. at 251, 254.
See generally Carl E. Schneider, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In this case, the Court
ruled that a state did not have to permit withdrawal of food and hydration tubes to an incompetent
patient when there was not clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient desired
to have the life support terminated. Nor did the state have to defer to the 'substituted judgment'
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further highlighted by court decisions respecting the 'right to choose' even morally
controversial medical treatments such as abortion and sex-change operations. The
right to choose seems to be one of the driving principles in American medical law
at this time.
Patient autonomy is further enhanced by the strong principle of confidentiality
protecting the privacy of patients. In the United States, 'every patient has the right
to expect that his or her privacy of person will be respected and that confidential
communications will not be divulged unless he or she has given permission for,
or the law requires, disclosure. ' 22 However, state laws generally require disclosure
in the public interest in cases of child abuse or certain communicable diseases,
such as HIV/AIDS (though most HIV/AIDS reporting preserves patient anonymity).
Traditional evidentiary privileges protect patient privacy by precluding a doctor
from testifying in court, but there are exceptions. Some states have held that a
physician's wrongful breach of confidence gives rise to a civil action for damages.
2

Medical treatment and human experimentation in general

As potent as the principle of patient autonomy is in American law and culture,
it must sometimes yield to the interests of public welfare. Thus concern for stopping
epidemics of contagious diseases in public schools may override a person's desire
not to be vaccinated. 23 Likewise, even though some advocates of abortion argue
that abortions may be done as safely by laymen as by doctors during the early stages
of pregnancy, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld laws requiring that abortion
be performed only by licensed physicians. 24 Public mores reflected in the law also
may prohibit some technically feasible procedures, such as physician-assisted
suicide. The clash between public health interests and other public policy values
often produces challenging public policy dilemmas. For instance, public antidiscrimination policies designed to protect the handicapped have led to the
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 25 and state
disability laws. Despite significant differences between communicable diseases
and physical disabilities (such as impairments of sight, hearing, walking, etc.) the
ADA applies to both. The Supreme Court has ruled that even people with contagious
diseases such as tuberculosis cannot be dismissed from teaching school without
implicating ADA claims. 26 In a number of cases, mandatory testing for HIV/AIDS
of certain professionals (nurses, firefighters) and potential transmitters (eg., non-

22
23
24
25
26

of the incompetent patient's parents who sought to have her life support discontinued on the
grounds that that was what the daughter would have wanted.
Legal Medicine, supra, at 208-12. See also id. at 381.
See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 521 U.S. 968 (1997).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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consensual partners and sexual offenders) has been challenged, though most such
requirements have been upheld. 27
Nontherapeutic research and experimentation are permissible when statutorily
mandated consent has been secured. Since 1975, the U.S. Department of Health
has established regulations that detail the way human research must be conducted
in order to protect human subjects by requiring and defining the scope of patient
informed consent. 28 These regulations were initially adopted shortly after the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study was exposed. That government study involved the fortyyear monitoring by government doctors of hundreds of African-Americans who
were infected with syphilis. Even after effective penicillin treatment became
available, treatment was not offered to the subjects, and those who asked were
sometimes discouraged from seeking treatment. 29 The federal regulations apply
to all government agencies and government-funded or -aided research (effectively
most significant medical research) and set standards for mandatory written consent
from human research subjects. These regulations also mandate the establishment
of institutional review boards (IRBs) consisting of at least five people of diverse
but knowledgeable backgrounds whose role it is to see that risks to human research
subjects are minimal and reasonable in light of anticipated benefits, to guarantee
that informed consent is obtained, and to approve, require modification of, or
disapprove all human research involving human subjects. 30
Related to IRBs are ethics committees, which began to appear in American
hospitals in the 1980s. Ethics committees consist of people experienced in
addressing issues arising from the conflict of law and morality. Unlike IRBs,
however, these committees do not police clinicians or interfere in the patientphysician relationship. Rather, their knowledge and skills in ethics and the law
may be consulted by doctors, nurses, patients, and families who face ethical
dilemmas regarding medical treatment. 31
Medical innovation and research are generally favored. A famous case from
the early days of the heart pump illustrates that policy. When Dr. Denton Cooley
had exhausted other ways of keeping his patient, Haskell Carp, alive, he implanted
the first completely mechanical heart into Mr. Carp. Mr. Carp died 32 hours later,
and a wrongful death suit was brought. A federal court however, directed a verdict
27

28

29
30
31
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See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board ofComm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1,909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990)
(mandatory HIV testing for licensed practical nurse);Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby,
779 F.Supp. 402 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (mandatory HIV testing for firefighters and paramedics
upheld); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d 80,847 P.2d455 (1993) (mandatory testing
of convicted sexual offenders, including juvenile offenders upheld).
Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R., Part 46. See generally
Legal Medicine at 204; Harold M. Ginzburg, Protection of Research Subjects in Clinical Research,
Legal Aspects of Medicine 51-59 (James R. Vevaina, et al, eds., 1989).
See generally James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (1981).
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124.
George A. Kanoti, Ethics, Medicine, and the Law, in Legal Aspects of Medicine, 77, 79-80.
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for Dr. Cooley. 32 Thus, medical researchers in the United States walk a tightrope
stretched between the pole of cultural values favoring innovation and independence
in research and the pole of principles disfavoring the exploitation or manipulation
of the vulnerable and uninformed by the powerful and expert.
Experimentation on fetuses, embryos, and pre-embryos takes the issue of
protection of human subjects (discussed infra in Part III.B.5) to a very fine, and
not unimportant, point. Some people argue that since the fetus is not a 'person,'
experimentation that holds some promise of benefit to humanity is morally justified.
Others strongly believe that using human fetuses or embryos for research is morally
reprehensible. 33 The issue remains highly volatile and highly political. For example,
when President Clinton lifted a ban on research involving tissue or cells from
embryos or fetuses killed by elective abortion (imposed by President Bush to avoid
a potential incentive for elective abortions), Congress responded by enacting a
federal statute to regulate federal support of research in this area. 34

3

Professional Competence and Malpractice Liability

Professional competence traditionally has been encouraged by professional selfregulation and civil liability for malpractice. Self-regulation historically has been
minimal, and the members of the medical guilds have generally supported each
other against external (especially legal) constraints. Civil liability for malpractice,
however, has been a major influence on medical attitudes and probably has
encouraged improvements in medical procedures. Because contingency-fee
agreements between attorneys and clients are permitted in medical malpractice
cases, even the poorest injured patients can obtain competent legal assistance to
aggressively seek compensation, and their lawyers have a direct pecuniary motive
to maximize the recovery.
A dramatic increase in loss-payments by medical malpractice insurance companies
(averaging more than 14% annually for more than a decade) generated a 'medical
malpractice crisis' in the 1980s, as doctors experienced great increases in their
insurance premium payments and physicians in some high-risk specialities became
nearly uninsurable. 35 Consequently, many states have enacted medical malpractice
reforms that limit the ability to recover excessive judgments by establishing pretrial
screening requirements, mandating alternative dispute resolution procedures before

32
33
34
35

Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974).
Fletcher, infra at note 112 at S:4, citing Alto Charo.
Fletcher, infra, at S:5-6 (Addendum). Restrictions on research on fetuses in utero is contained
in 42 USC§ 289g(b) and 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2). See Biolaw S:60 (January 1999).
David J. Nye, et al, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data
and Insurance Company Finances, 76 Geo. L. J. 1495 (1988).
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allowing civil litigation, limiting the amount or types of recovery (such as capping
pain and suffering damage awards), and adopting no-fault schemes for certain kinds
of injuries (replacing tort remedies with administratively administered compensation
recovery programs). 36 Medical malpractice liability, nonetheless, continues to be
an economic restraint against overly aggressive consumer marketing of artificial
procreation products and services, although such marketing seems hardly necessary
in the current environment of aging baby-boom generation adults belatedly anxious
to discover the joys of childrearing.

B.

International Law

The United States has generally been more reluctant than most other industrialized
countries to enter into the kind of treaties that affect family law, biomedicine, and
human rights. The reasons for this are too copious, complex, and controversial
to summarize fully. However, any account should start with the federalist principle.
As we suggested earlier, much of family law and health law is constitutionally
confided to the state, not the federal governments. It is true that the federal
government has broadly interpreted powers to regulate interstate commerce and
that the billions of dollars the federal government distributes to state governments
can be used as a lever to influence state law. Nevertheless, the federalist principle
retains authority in many quarters for at least two reasons. First, from colonial times
many Americans have been suspicious of the power of the central government.
Second, in a country as large and various as the United States federalism has been
one way of keeping government close to the people. The federalist principle, then,
raises a presumption (however rebuttable) that family and health law questions
are not properly questions of federal law. Indeed, there may even be an argument
that the federal government's authority to enter into treaties regarding such
questions is constitutionally dubious.
The American interpretation of the democratic principle probably also works
to make the country more hesitant to enter treaties in these areas. To be sure, treaties
are agreed to by democratically elected governments. But their terms are not worked
out through the usual kinds of democratic negotiation. And once a treaty becomes
law, it is interpreted by unelected courts. Americans have an exceptionally strong
principle of judicial review, and both the right and the left have come to believe
(at different points in history) that that power is most troublesome when courts
interpret documents (like the Constitution and treaties) which cannot be readily
amended by the legislature. In recent years, the Supreme Court's innovations in
precisely the area of family law and biomedicine - principally in Roe v. Wade -

36
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have seemed problematic to many conservatives and moderates. This has probably
made treaty-making in this area even more unpalatable.
None of this should suggest, however, that the question whether the United
States should sign treaties of this kind often rises to the level of political
controversy. It does not. This is partly because it is the rare American who thinks
he can best accomplish what he wants domestically through such treaties or who
believes that treaties in these areas will much affect genuinely deplorable conduct
abroad. If anything, these treaties tend to be regarded quite skeptically as grand
but vague statements of principles complacently signed even by countries with
no intention of adhering to them. When to all this is added the American history
of isolationism (much abetted by the considerable size of the country and its oceanic
separation from all but two other countries), it may even seem unsurprising that
Americans have not rushed to sign these treaties.
Despite all these factors, the United States has signed the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. 37 The United States also has signed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 38 Obviously, the United States of America
is not a party to European regional agreements. Among the relevant regional
documents relating to biomedical, family, and human rights law that do not apply
in the United States are the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard
to the Application of Biology and Medicine (commonly referred to as the
'Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine'), the Treaty of Rome, the Council
of Europe Protocol banning human cloning, the Draft Additional Protocol on
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin for Application to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (2-3 Feb. 1999); 39 and the
Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings. 40 The United
States also has not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, due
largely to questions about the ability of the federal government to enter such a treaty
and concerns about some ambiguous and controversial substantial provisions. Nor
has the United States subscribed to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome

37
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A Guide to the U.S. Treaties in Force at 27 (Igor I. Kavass, ed., 1996). The Covenants entered
into force on March 3, 1976, and September 8, 1992, respectively.
1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 53, U.N. Sales No. 1950 1.11.
Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI), Abridged Report of the 15th Meeting of the CDBI
(Strasbourg, 7-10, December 1998) (<http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/l 998/98cm2 l 2add l.htm>
(excluding reproductive cells like sperm, eggs, embryos and fetal/embryo tissue) (visited June
22, 1999).
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of Human
Beings with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine on the Prohibiting of Cloning
Human Beings, ETS No. 168, signed by 19 nations on January 12, 1998.
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and Human Rights (November, 1997).41 Applications have not been made to
international courts by the United States concerning biomedical issues. There is,
of course, judicial review of the constitutionality of biomedical regulations in the
courts of the United States. 42

II

Genetics: Statutes, Case Law, Research

A.

Introduction

American public policy toward genetic engineering is influenced by five general
tendencies of American public policy. First, public policy is ordinarily more
centrally concerned for the individual than the group. Second, individual liberty
frequently takes priority over social welfare. Third, innovation and progress are
commonly valued more than conformity. Fourth, research is often driven by the
market, and regulations are often influenced by companies and people with financial
and personal interests in them. Fifth, public policy tends to develop case by case
rather than through the early establishment of general pre-emptive regulations. 43
Contemporary biomedical issues typically involve fierce, unresolved tensions
including morality versus efficiency, pro-life values versus pro-choice values,
principles versus convenience, and immediate-versus-long-term perspectives.Yet
all these values and tensions interact in an environment pervaded by the American
spirit of pragmatism and in a constitutional system where the structural morality
encourages policy-making by accommodation, compromise, and consensus. Getting
along and getting the job done usually seem to matter most in America, and that
spirit seems to moderate some of the extremes in values, viewpoints, and personality
that thrive in the open and individualistic American milieu.
In the United States, there are few regulations regarding genetic engineering
or cloning and even fewer regarding artificial-reproduction technology. U.S. laws
relating to cloning are in a state of fumbling transition. Traditionally, most genetic
and fertility research has been conducted in the private sector, where financial
considerations often seem to outweigh social and ethical considerations. (See infra
Part 111.B.5.)

41

42
43
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Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of the Universal Declaration oon the Human
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1

Genetic Discrimination and Genetic Privacy

As information about the human genetic code burgeons, advocates of privacy and
sunshine clash. The former fear that the disclosure of someone's genetic
abnormalities will lead insurers to discriminate against him unfairly; the latter fear
that concealing genetic information will cause fraud, manipulation, and undue
expense. On one hand, ordinary citizens increasingly fear for the privacy of their
genetic information. On the other hand, as Professor Richard Epstein writes, '[t]he
plea for privacy is often a plea for the right to misrepresent one's self to the rest
of the world. ' 44
Some genetic information clearly is relevant to risk assessment. 45 Thus,
insurers, who want to identify risks more accurately and allocate costs to risks more
efficiently, now request, in addition to information about smoking and occupation,
information about infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 46
Some insurance companies have charged applicants increased premiums or have
denied them coverage or benefits because they are particularly likely to develop
a disease. This has sparked a vehement reaction in some quarters against 'genetic
discrimination.' For example, Vice-President Gore has said, '[G]enetic progress
should not become a new excuse for discrimination.' 47
Public concern about misuse of genetic information has caused some state
legislatures to enact laws to prevent discrimination based on genetic information.
These laws, in tum, have also generated controversy. For example, the president
of the California Health Care Institute spoke for many insurers when he argued
that public 'fears ... are producing a spate of ill-advised laws that will have serious
unintended consequences in the private insurance industry. ' 48 Other insurance
industry representatives have decried the lack of uniformity in 'patchwork' state

44

45

46
47
48

Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New
Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1994), cited in Meredith A. Jagutis, Comment, Insurer's
Access to Genetic Information: The Call for Comprehensive Federal Legislation, 82 Marquette
L. Rev. 429, 444 (1999) (hereinafter 'Jagutis').
For example, females with a mutation to the gene BRCAl may have an eighty-five percent chance
of developing breast cancer, and a fifty percent chance of developing ovarian cancer, and a person
with the genetic marker for Huntington's chorea is nearly certain to develop the disease, and
of course, someone with the HIV virus is almost certain likely to contract AIDS. See generally
John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311,330 (1997) (hereinafter
'Jacobi').
Jacobi, at 330-331.
See Reuters, Genes and Discrimination: Gore Urges Laws Banning Bias in Hiring and Insurance,
Newsday, Jan. 21, 1998, at A20, cited in Jagutis at 429.
David Gollaher, All Can Use Gene Tests ... Except Poor Screening Helps Insurers and (Surprise)
Patients with Risks and Money, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 11, 1998, at El, cited in Jagutis
at 429.
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legislation drafted by local lawmakers who do not always understand the science, 49
and there have been calls for federal legislation. 50
Laws regarding use by insurers of genetic testing appear to have gone through
three phases in the United States. First, laws prohibited insurance underwriting
based on specifically identified genetic traits. Next, states barred the use of genetic
testing altogether in underwriting. Finally, laws barring insurance industry use of
genetic information broadened beyond information collected in laboratory tests.
Legislation in this area is a growth industry. For example, in 1997, 153 bills
concerning genetic discrimination or genetic privacy were introduced in state
legislatures in America. The apparent goal of some of these bills was to encourage
the use of genetic tests by individuals by protecting the privacy of the results. 51
Concern about the spread of AIDS has spawned a number of bills (including bills
mandating testing and disclosing results for sex offenders and prostitutes and
reporting epidemiological information) which have engendered controversy between
victims, rights advocates and public health officials, on one hand, and, on the other,
AIDS activists who fear that to AIDS patients may be stigmatized by the inadvertent
disclosure of AIDS/HIV-positive status or who fear that the reporting requirements
will discourage voluntary testing.
The genetic privacy and nondiscrimination laws that the states have enacted
vary significantly, since they define terms differently and contain different
exceptions. By 1996, at least twenty-four states had legislation that either provided
protection against genetic discrimination or prohibited genetic testing in insurance
or employment, and similar legislation was introduced in 1997 in at least eighteen
other states.52 Many states also prohibit insurers from requiring or requesting genetic
tests; six states even bar insurers from considering whether the insured or applicant
has applied for or refused a genetic test. 53 For example, a California law declares:
'No [health care service] plan shall refuse to enroll any person or accept any
person as a subscriber after appropriate application on the basis of a person's
genetic characteristics that may, under some circumstances, be associated with
disability in that person or that person's offspring' nor 'require a higher rate or
charge, or offer or provide different terms, conditions, or benefits, on the basis
of a person's genetic characteristics ... .' 54
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At the federal level, little significant legislation has yet been enacted, 55 but
at least nine bills to prohibit genetic discrimination or protect genetic privacy have
been introduced.56 These federal bills typically propose to prohibit a group health
plan from denying, limiting, or canceling a plan based on genetic information or
on the request or receipt of genetic information. These bills generally are supported
by organizations such as the American Cancer Society, the National Breast Cancer
Coalition, the Council for Responsible Genetics, the National Action Plan on Breast
Cancer, and the National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research. 57 While
insurance is primarily regulated by the states, some important federal laws regulate
insurance companies, and the problem is national, not local. The most significant
federal legal initiative probably is the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission's interpretation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), an interpretation
which indicates that the enforcing agency believes that the Act prohibits 'discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease or other
disorders. ' 58
The antidiscrimination approach reflects the strong egalitarian strain in
American politics and society. However, there obviously are limits to this approach.
All genes are not equal. Thus, while American generally oppose 'genetic
discrimination' in insurance coverage, when it comes to allocation of funds to fight
disease they willingly discriminate by giving much more money to study some
genetic conditions than others. In any event, with or without new Jaws, the explosion
in knowledge about genetics will surely transform the worlds of insurance,
employment, privacy, and public health. 59

2

Genetic Screening of Newborns

Screening of newborn infants is widely advocated and widely practised. But it is
not unproblematic. Despite the educational benefits and low costs of obtaining
parental consent to neonatal screening, mandatory neonatal genetic testing without
meaningful parental informed consent is widespread. 60 'Today, every state and
the District of Columbia tests for PKU and for congenital hypothyroidism, while
55
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48 [states] test for galactosemia, 44 for sickle-cell anemia, 24 for maple syrup urine
disease, 16 each for homocystinuria and congenital adrenal hyperplasis, 19 for
biotinidase deficiency, 4 for CF [cystic fibrosis], 2 each for toxoplasmosis and
tyrosinemia, and 1 for congenital hearing deficit.' 61

B

Regulation of Specific Techniques

1

General regulation

The following techniques are legally permitted in the United States: preimplantation
genetic diagnosis, 62 prenatal genetic diagnosis, 63 and genetic diagnosis of newborns,
children, adolescents, engaged couples, and couples considering having a child. 64
Research on human embryos is permitted in some instances and illegal in others. 65
This kind of research is legally permitted and requires no particular consent beyond
the general consent outlined earlier; often genetic counseling is offered, but such
counseling is not mandatory. 66 Private research costs are met by private money
whereas public research funding is obtained through the Department of Health
and Human Services. Public research generally is subject to much greater
governmental constraint than is private research.

2

Genetic Diagnosis

Genetic diagnosis is legal in the United States. It is most often used to screen for
birth and health defects. 67 Testing for gender selection is opposed by many but
occurs often in clinics around the country because there are no laws prohibiting
genetic selection.

3

Paternity and Maternity Tests

Paternity tests are legal in the United States under certain conditions. Thirty-nine
station allow for the admission in court of blood tests, sixteen states expressly allow
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admission of DNA testing (and de facto all states now use and prefer DNA testing),
and forty-eight states expressly allow HLA testing. 68
Debate is growing over the extent to which scientific tests that can accurately
identify biological parentage should be used to establish legal parentage.
Historically, legal parentage has been predicated upon biological parentage.
However, as biotechnology increases the ability to procreate without human sexual
relations, the old biological presumption is eroding. At the same time, biotechnology
is increasing the ability to challenge and disprove historic presumptions of
biological parentage (particularly the husband's paternity of a child born to an
adulterous wife). This has given rise to some hotly debated decisions regarding
the constitutionality or rationality of state laws which support or deviate from the
old biological presumptions of legal paternity. If an adulterous paramour can prove
with new biotechnology (usually DNA testing) that he is the biological father of
the child born to a married woman, is he instead of (or in addition to) her husband
entitled to paternity rights, including custody, or visitation, or inheritance? (A
famous Supreme Court decision ruled that the Constitution did not require states
to grant the paramour such an entitlement.)69 If a husband can prove in a divorce
proceeding that he is not the biological father of a child born to his adulterous wife
during their marriage, is he nonetheless obligated to support the child, despite his
wife's infidelity and deception? (Several state courts have ruled that he is.) 70 Some
cases suggest a strict liability theory of paternity - absent legislation providing
an exception, a male is strictly held to the financial responsibilities of paternity,
if his sperm conceived the child- even if the mother promised (falsely) to use birth
control or to abort, even if she expressly agreed (falsely) not to pursue paternity
or child support, even if she obtained his sperm while he was unconscious, without
his consent. 71 The controversy is not likely to abate soon.

4

Medical Confidentiality and Responsibility

Protecting the confidentiality of a patient's medical history has long been a tradition
in medicine. 72 The Hippocratic Oath states, 'And whatever I shall see or hear in
the course of my profession, ... it if be what should not be published abroad, I
will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.' 73 However, while
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confidentiality is important, it is not absolute. Some obligations are valued more
than confidentiality. 74 One such obligation is the duty to protect and preserve life.
Two groups, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1983 and the
Committee on Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medicine of 1994, have
identified conditions under which confidentiality could ethically be breached
and relatives informed about genetic risks. In their view, relatives could be
informed if: I) all attempts to illicit voluntary disclosure from the patient have
failed; 2) there is a high probability of irreversible or fatal harm to the relative
without disclosure; 3) the disclosure of the information will prevent the harm;
4) the disclosure is limited to the information necessary for the diagnosis and/or
treatment of the relative. 75

Doctors who make these disclosure decisions carelessly run the risk of being sued
by their patients. 76
Concerns about 'genetic privacy' create a dilemma for lawmakers. The
fundamental goals of the health care system - good care, universal coverage,
equitable treatment, and consumer choice at a reasonable cost - cannot be achieved
without thorough, complete, accurate health data. 77 However, collecting personal
health data invades privacy. As Lawrence 0. Gostin puts it: 'Health information
is perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any information maintained
about an individual. As the nation's health care system grows in size, scope, and
integration, the susceptibility of that information to disclosure will also increase. ' 78
Americans who cherish their privacy generally believe that it is not adequately
protected. In a 1993 poll, eighty percent of the Americans surveyed thought
consumers had lost all control over how medical information about them is
circulated and used; eighty-five percent said protecting the confidentiality of
medical records is an absolutely essential or very important part of national health
care reform. 79
Several private groups of scientists, doctors, and health-law experts have
proposed model laws to protect genetic privacy or prevent genetic discrimination. 80
An influential California law, for example, requires that in state-sponsored
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hereditary disorder programs, '[a]ll testing results and personal information from
hereditary disorders programs obtained from any individual ... [shall] be held
confidential and be considered a confidential medical record [except as parents
or guardians or the individual consent to release].' 81 However, it has been said
that American law neither adequately protects privacy nor ensures fair information
practices, and some experts are skeptical that the public 'can have it both ways:
that adequate legal protection of informational privacy will eliminate the need to
significantly limit the collection of health data.' 82
Another privacy concern is associated with the ubiquitous use of computers
by health care providers, health services, and the health insurers. Computerization
of health records has increased the possibility of inadvertent disclosure to third
persons or access to confidential records by third persons. 83
Genetic research and engineering clearly have opened numerous new legal
issues pertaining to genetic identity, discrimination, personhood, screening,
diagnosis, parentage, and confidentiality. While some fear-driven legislative and
regulatory responses have emerged, the prevailing tendency in America has been
to wait and see, to address the legal questions only when they arise, and to combine
faith in the future with respect for human dignity and for individual genetic integrity.

III Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Law: Statutes, Case Law,
and Practice
A

Introduction

The American tradition described in the General Introduction is not the only factor
that inhibits any unified governmental response to the rise of reproductive
technologies. Several more specific factors deter such a response. The first, of
course, is the speed with which those technologies arise, proliferate, and mutate.
The second is the entrepreneurial spirit of American medicine, which encourages
individual doctors and medical centers to respond aggressively and imaginatively
to the demand for medical services and even to try to stimulate demand for them.
The third is the absence of a national system of paying for health care and the
presence of a system which permits a variety of responses to each new development
in medical ingenuity.
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B

The Several Technologies: Their Law and Practice

Having explained why any attempt to summarize the practice and law of
reproductive technologies in the United States must fail, we will proceed,
nonetheless, to examine several of the major techniques many civil law jurisdictions.
Official registration of birth and civil status is highly and formally regulated and
has significant legal ramifications. But in the United States, establishing parentage
historically has been and largely still is quite informal. For most parents and
children, parentage is established by three presumptions - the presumption of the
maternity of the woman who gave birth to a child, the presumption of the paternity
of her husband, if she is married, and the presumption of paternity by open
acknowledgment or cohabitation if she is not. 84 Because artificial procreation can
create situations which defy the assumptions upon which these presumptions are
based, many parentage controversies have arisen about it.

I

Surrogacy

The trends we described in the introduction are perhaps best illustrated by the story
of arrangements in which a woman agrees to bear another woman's child - a practice
Americans have come to refer to as surrogate motherhood. When surrogacy became
technically possible, entrepreneurs quickly began to offer their services as brokers
in bringing together surrogates and people who wished to hire them. Because this
arrangement was novel, states did not have statutes regulating it. Typically, the
policy issue first achieved prominence as a legal issue in a case - Matter of Baby
M. 85 There a married woman entered into a contract in which she agreed to be
impregnated by artificial insemination with sperm coming from the husband of
another married couple. When the child was born, the woman refused to give the
child to the couple. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the contract was
unenforceable because it conflicted with New Jersey statutes concerning adoption
and the termination of parental rights and with public policy concerning families
and the formation of contracts. For example, the court said, 'This is the sale of
a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child, ' 86 which New
Jersey law prohibited. The court then treated the case as a child-custody dispute
and awarded custody to the biological father.
Another variation on surrogacy appeared in a later, somewhat less prominent,
case - Johnson v. Calvert. 81 In that case, a married couple signed a contract with
84
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a woman in which she agreed to have implanted in her womb an embryo created
by the sperm and egg of a married couple. Here too the woman refused to give
the child to the couple when it was born. The California Supreme Court gave
custody to the married couple, since 'she who intended to procreate the child that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own - is the natural mother under California law.' 88
As these opinions suggest, courts asked to decide disputes arising out of
surrogacy contracts have based their decisions on common law principles (e.g.,
principles about which contracts are void because they violate public policy) and
on statutes not written with these contracts in mind (e.g., statutes regulating adoption
and specifying the treatment of children born out of wedlock). All of the parties
to these disputes have been able to find sustenance for their arguments in the
Constitution. Courts, however, have been reluctant to make those very difficult
arguments the bases for their conclusions, not least because each party can make
some colorable constitutional claim.
In response to judicial decisions of this kind (and indeed to calls for help from
the courts), state legislatures began to pass statutes specifically regulating surrogacy
contracts. Several states have proscribed the arrangement where money is
exchanged, and others have strictly regulated the procedure (although the
effectiveness of such regulation remains unclear). 89 For example, New Hampshire
requires the parties to a surrogacy contract to jointly petition the court for a judicial
preauthorization of the surrogacy agreement based on, among other things, genetic
and psychological evaluations of the parties. 90
2

In Vitro Fertilization

In vitro fertilization is much more common than surrogacy arrangements, but it
is even less regulated. It is available to consenting adults in approximately 350
clinics throughout the United States. In general, however, only the wealthy can
afford such treatments, since the cost of each 'cycle' can exceed $8,000, and the
procedure is not covered by most health insurance plans. A survey from the Centers
for Disease Control of 300 of these clinics suggested that more than 64,000 such
attempts were made in 1996 and that somewhat more than 20,000 children were
born of these efforts, a disproportionate number of them in multiple births. 91
88
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Egg donation is one of the fastest growing areas of IVF. The CDC reported
more than 5,000 such donations in some 227 clinics in 1996. The procedure in
which eggs are removed from the donor is not undemanding. Furthermore, the pool
of donors is not unlimited, since the preferred donor is a woman under the age
of 35 with an unremarkable medical history. Thus donors typically can command
between $2,500-$3,500 and even up to $5,000 in large urban areas like New York.
lntracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) was developed approximately seven
years ago and is now widespread in the United States. The procedure, which costs
roughly $10,000 per attempt, fertilizes an egg by injecting a single sperm cell past
both the outer and inner membrane of the egg cell. The treatment remedies most
deficiencies in male sperm production - inability to ejaculate, immature sperm,
weak sperm, or low sperm counts. Prior to ICSI, only 5% of cases of male infertility
were treatable. With it, nearly 99% of 'infertile' males can produce biological
children. Recently, however, ICSihas provoked some concerns. At least one study
has suggested that the procedure may cause cellular damage to the egg. 92
Although the first American IVF birth occurred more than fifteen years ago,
the field has been largely unregulated by the federal government. The federal
government's first significant step into the area was more informational than
regulatory: In 1992, Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992 (the Wyden Bill), which required an accounting of IVF
births. 93 Even this modest gesture, however, had only a postponed effect, since
the Department of Health and Human Services declined to fund the project until
1995.
State regulation is similarly sparse. Approximately sixteen states have laws
that even mention human cell transfers. Some of these statutes require certification
by state boards, some screening of donors, and some annual reporting. However,
most states have been content to let the industry regulate itself. 94

3

The Fate of the Embryo: Who Decides?

The rise of in vitro fertilization has led to questions about who should decide the
fate of the fertilized eggs (which can endure in cryogenic limbo for years).
Ordinarily, of course, the couple who contributed the genetic material have that
power. And the practice- often given legal force through contracts between clinics
and clients - has generally been that where the parties fail to act, the IVF clinic
takes on the authority. Nevertheless, the predictable disputes have arisen, which
have initiated law's response to the problem by bringing in the courts.
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Courts have faced the question of embryo ownership in two spectacular state
cases this decade, cases which reached results which were not necessarily
consistent. In Davis v. Davis, 95 the attempts of a married couple, Mary Sue and
Junior Davis, to have a child through IVF had yielded a number of frozen embryos
(zygotes). The Davises then decided to divorce. Mary Sue wanted to donate the
zygotes to another woman, but Junior did not want to become a father. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held for Junior. It said that a woman's right to privacy
does not encompass a general right to procreate and that Junior's right not to become
an unwilling parent outweighed Mary Sue's right to donate the zygotes. The court
was probably grateful not to have to determine who would have won had Mary
Sue wished to utilize the zygotes herself instead of donating them to a third party.
Kass v. Kass, 96 on the other hand, involved a couple who, before beginning
IVF, had signed forms that required the consent of both parties before the clinic
could release the zygotes to either party and that gave the clinic permission to donate
the zygotes for research if the parties did not reach an agreement. After a divorce,
Maureen Kass, who was forty years old and regarded the frozen zygotes as her
best hope of having children, sought the zygotes without her former husband's
permission. A New York trial court awarded them to her over her ex-husband's
objection, holding that the consent forms were so badly drafted that they were
unenforceable and noting that the constitutional right of privacy, which includes
both a right to procreate and a right not to become a parent against one's will,
supported Maureen's claim. The court said that a husband has no right to procreate
or avoid procreation because he has no role in the decision to have an abortion.
On appeal, however, the judgment was reversed. The New York Court of Appeals
unanimously held that the parties' clearly expressed intent that the IVF clinic be
able to donate the zygotes for research controlled, that the woman's constitutional
right to procreative privacy and bodily integrity was not implicated, and that the
zygotes were not 'persons' in the constitutional sense.
Cases of this kind have evoked some legal responses. While statutes
specifically regulating the status of frozen embryos have generally not been
enacted,97 the typical forerunners of legislation have begun to emerge. For example,
the American Bar Association's Section on Genetics and Reproduction is drafting
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a code it hopes will guide legislatures. 98 In addition, federal law prohibits donating
most embryos for federally funded research. 99
4

Posthumous Reproduction

The legal problems presented by the new reproductive technology are about to
become yet more complex, for it has become possible to take sperm from a dead
man. The first fetus known to be produced by the posthumous removal of gametes
was due in March 1999. The sperm donor, the woman's husband, died in 1994.
However, within 30 hours of his death his wife asked that his sperm be removed
in order to permit her to undergo IVF at some later date. Four years later she
conceived using his sperm. Post-mortem removal of gametes has recently become
prominent enough that the American Society of Reproductive Medicine has
developed a protocol- 'Posthumous Reproduction' -to govern it. Although reliable
estimates of the number of postmortem removals are difficult to come by, a 1997
study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Bioethics found
that at least fourteen clinics in eleven states had performed the procedure. 100
In January of this year, a New York state legislator introduced legislation
that would ban posthumous sperm collection in the absence of prior written consent.
In the meantime, because legislation in this area is only nascent, doctors are left
to their consciences whether to perform these operations. It might be argued that
a spouse can 'donate' a dead partner's gametes to herself or himself under the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which is law in all fifty states. 101 Whether such a
donation would qualify as 'transplantation' under the act is unclear, however. The
attempt to make this novel situation fit a statute written without that situation in
mind is, however, typical of efforts to adapt old law to new reproductive techniques.
Although posthumous sperm donation is too novel to have produced case
law, much less legislation, posthumous reproduction has reached the courts in a
different guise. In a recent case in California, 102 Hecht v. Superior Court, a man
by contract and will expressly donated and bequeathed vials of his frozen sperm
to his girlfriend before he committed suicide. However, his adult children by a
former marriage sought to enjoin the girlfriend from receiving the vials. The
California Court of Appeals awarded the ownership of the frozen sperm to the
girlfriend on the grounds that the sperm were not subject to the property division
with the former wife and that the dead man had clearly expressed his intent to give
the sperm to his girlfriend.
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Cases like Davis and Hecht raise questions about the legal status of
reproductive material that courts have struggled to answer. Does such material
- and particularly do fertilized eggs-have any of the quality of 'human life'? The
Davis court, for instance, said that 'preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either
'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human interest.' Even if questions of this
sort can be resolved, others will remain. Can genetic material be owned? Can it
be the subject of binding contracts? Should its control be determined according
to the usual rules of child custody? These remain unanswered questions with which
the courts and legislatures of the federal government and of the fifty states are
wrestling.
5

Cloning

Dr. Ian Wilmut's announcement in February 1997 that a lamb named Dolly had
been produced by cloning an adult sheep evoked an unusually rapid - if still quite
partial - legal response in the United States. (As one comment put it, 'Dolly, the
famous cloned sheep, has sparked much more than 'three bags full' of
controversy.') 103 President Clinton quickly called for a moratorium on human
cloning research and directed the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to study
the implications of human cloning. In June 1997 the panel recommended a
moratorium on any clonal research for three to five years and suggested that federal
legislation in this area was needed. 104 The committee also said that the Food and
Drug Administration (which had ardently opposed human cloning) should have
oversight over any effort, public or private, to clone a human. Accordingly,
President Clinton sent Congress his proposed Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997,
and the President also issued an executive order banning the use of federal funds
for research into cloning human beings. 105 In Congress, at least nine bills were
introduced in 1997 to prohibit the use of federal funds for research on the cloning
of humans. 106 However, none of the bills passed. At present, there are no federal
statutes regulating human cloning research except the general laws regulating human
research.
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State legislators also were quick to respond to the possibility of human cloning
research. Legislation was introduced in at least twenty-eight states to prohibit or
regulate human cloning. 107 However, the first and only state to pass such legislation
was California, which did so on January 1, 1998. The legislation (1) creates a panel
of experts to study cloning and requires the panel to report to the governor and
legislature, (2) is only in effect for five years, (3) prohibits any person from cloning
a human being, (4) bars purchasing or selling an ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus
for the purpose of human cloning, and (5) gives the state health director authority
to punish violators (whether corporations or individuals) with fines up to one million
dollars. 108
The ban on federally funded human cloning research has not prevented
privately funded research. A controversial Chicago physicist, Richard Seed,
announced in 1997 that he will set up a laboratory for cloning studies in Japan,
where he will create clones of rare species, pets, and human beings, and he said
that he would clone himself to prove that his cloning procedure works. 109 However,
most reputable American scientific organizations oppose human cloning research
at the present time. For example, the American Society of Reproductive Medicine,
the Biotechology Industry Organization, and the Federation of American Societies
of Experimental Biology have all stated that their members will not participate
in any efforts to clone a human being. 110
Despite the number of bills introduced in federal and state legislatures to
prohibit cloning, it appears that more and more forms of cloning are becoming
politically acceptable. In November 1998, President Clinton supported the ban
of funding for cloning research because the benefits were hypothetical. Five months
later, in March 1999, President Clinton said that it was 'time to take another look.'
Much of Clinton's change of heart occurred when the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) informed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that
research using pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos can be funded
by the federal government and could be valuable both to research and health. 111
In 1994, the (NIH) Human Embryo Research Panel determined that federal funding
would cover research with two kinds of human embryos-excess embryos from
IVF artificial procreation and IVF embryos created for research. 112 This was
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criticized on moral grounds by people with 'pro-life' values and on the pragmatic
ground that there was inadequate evidence of real benefit from research on living
human embryos. 113 President Clinton ordered the NIH not to support research
involving the second kind of embryos-those specifically created for research.
Congress went one step further and banned all federal funding of life-threatening
(rather than life-enhancing) research involving human embryos. The Federal law
prohibits spending federal tax dollars for 'the creation of a human embryo' for
research purposes (e.g., paying someone to conceive and abort embryos or to donate
IVF embryos), and also bars federal funding of 'research in which a human embryo
[is] destroyed, discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death.' An
embryo is defined as any organism 'that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning or any other means from one or more human gametes or diploid cells.' 114
The application of this law to research on pluripotent stem cells (PSC) derived
from human blastocysts has been controversial. The controversy came to a head
most recently when Dr. James Thomson reported in November 1998 that his team
at the University of Wisconsin, using only private funding, had isolated stem cells
from human embryos and 'coaxed' them to grow, without differentiating, into five
'immortal' cell lines. Several other similar research projects were also underway
at the time at other universities in America and other countries. Some scientists
believe that with further research they may 'be able to tailor stem cells genetically
so that they would avoid attack by a patient's immune system, then direct them
to specialize into a particular kind of tissue and transplant them into diseased
organs,' such as into a damaged heart, to regenerate healthy tissue. 115
After the Thomson research report of PSC research success in 1997, and following
the disclosure (the same month) by the head of a biotechnology company that his
company had fused an enucleated cow's egg with a human cell, President Clinton
asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to study the PSC situation. 116
The response emphasized that fusing a human cell and nonhuman egg to clone
human beings should not be funded.
On January 19, 1999, following a favorable legal opinion from the Office
of General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Director
of the NIH announced to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission that NIH
intends to support research using pluripotential stem cells and will develop
regulations covering such research. 117 The DHHS's legal opinion concluded that
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pluripotential stem cells and cell lines developed from them are not 'human
embryos' as defined in the statute because they are not 'organisms' and cannot
develop into a human being even if transferred to a uterus. 118 However, since PSCs
are manipulated from human embryos, the integrity of that legal opinion is
controversial. Seventy members of the House of Representatives and seven Senators
have responded to it by writing to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
repudiating that interpretation of the federal funding ban. 119

6

Alternative Reproduction and the Health of the Child

No federal legislation requires that clinics or doctors collect genetic information
about gamete donors, and only a handful of states require the collection of such
information. Among the most comprehensive of the statutes is New Hampshire's,
which requires the screening of all gamete donors and says in pertinent part:
No gamete shall be used in an in vitro fertilization or preembryo transfer
procedure, unless the gamete donor has been medically evaluated and the
results, documented in accordance with rules adopted by the department of
health and human services, demonstrate the medical acceptability of the person
as a gamete donor. 120

However, few states can claim a system as comprehensive as New Hampshire's.
Indeed, many facilities need not be licensed, although some may come under the
ambit of general statutes regulating 'tissue banks.' Consequently, the responsibility
for screening gametes for genetic defects lies initially with clinics and ultimately
with the supervising physician.
Of greater practical import is the medical standard of care imposed by the
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, which requires doctors to take
genetic histories from donors, egg donors, embryo donors, and surrogates in order
to eliminate carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene. 121 However, even such informal
measures are not beyond legal question. For example, in 1998 a husband and wife
sued the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center on the grounds that its policy
of requiring blood tests, psychological evaluations, and genetic screening as a
condition of participation in its in vitro fertilization program violated their rights
under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act. 122 While the suit was
dismissed, similar challenges would not be astonishing.
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C

Uniform Laws

At least four separate 'uniform laws' dealing with parentage have been proposed
in the United States that could apply to artificial procreation. These acts are not
binding when drafted but are promulgated as model laws by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, a group of state-appointed
legal experts. Generally the American Bar Association also recommends them to
the various state legislatures for adoption. However, until a legislature of a particular
state enacts them, they are of no legal effect.
The Uniform Act on Paternity (UAP) was proposed in 1960 but was only
adopted by six states. 123 The UAP primarily addressed the paternity and support
obligations of fathers of children born out of wedlock and added little to the existing
common law and statutes of most states. It relied entirely on the presumption of
natural procreation. The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was promulgated in 1973
and was adopted by 17 states. 124 Again, the bulk of the UPA dealt with the paternity
of children conceived naturally but born out of wedlock; for example, it accorded
parental status to the 'natural mother' of a child, - i.e. the woman who had 'given
birth to the child.' It also attempted some regulation of parentage of children born
by artificial insemination by providing that the man who consented in writing to
the artificial insemination of his wife was deemed the natural father of the child
and that the semen donor who delivered semen to a licensed physician for
anonymous artificial insemination had no parental rights or duties. 125 But that simple
provision was the extent of the UPA' s regulation of artificial procreation.
The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (UPUFA), proposed in 1988,
was drafted to confer greater parental rights upon fathers of children born out of
wedlock, but it explicitly excluded from protection as a father 'a donor of semen
used in artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization whose identity is not known
to the mother of the resulting child or whose semen was donated under circumstances indicating that the donor did not anticipate having any interest in the resulting
child.' 126 However, the UPUFA was not adopted by any state. Finally, the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) was promulgated in
1988. It provides that the husband of a woman who gave birth through assisted
conception with his consent is the father of the child, that donors for assisted
conception (except married persons donating to conceive a child of the marriage)
are not parents, and that a dead person is not a parent of a child of assisted
conception. It also provides for court-approved surrogacy agreements by which
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the intended (not biological) parents are the legal parents. 127 However, the USCACA
has been adopted by only two states.
The most obvious point that emerges from this brief review of 'uniform acts'
in the United States is that there is no uniformity in American statutes regulating
artificial procreation. Even the drafters of 'uniform laws' have produced divergent
rather than uniform recommendations, and the state legislatures have largely ignored
the efforts to create uniformity by model legislation. The independence of the
American character and the pragmatic American approach to issues thus has led
American legislatures to deal incrementally with issues rather than to create a
system of anticipatory rules that may be unnecessary- or even counterproductive
- in dealing with the unexpected realities that emerge from scientific developments.
As one legal commentator put it,
attention to the costs of mistakes counsels caution in resorting to law at all
and suggests a preference for relatively low-level responses (common law, some
administrative responses, some noncriminal state legislation) unless and until
one is persuaded that a real and pressing need, which can only be met by
extreme measures, exists, and that the costs or resorting to the extreme measures
will not outweigh the gains. 128

D

Conclusion

In sum, this brief survey suggests that the American response to the new genetic
and reproductive technologies has been a cautious one. Courts have generally been
the legal institution asked to take the first step by deciding specific cases. The
legislation which has followed such steps has generally sought to deal with
particularly problematic aspects of some new development and has generally not
attempted to write comprehensive rules for an uncertain future.

1

Reflections About Genetic Technology Developments in American Law

Many difficult personal ethical and public policy dilemmas arise with the
development of new genetic technologies that directly affect families. 129 For
instance, does a subject who learns through genetic testing that he or she has a
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serious genetic risk factor have a duty to share that information with close relatives
(like siblings or children) who are also at risk or with spouses whose lives may
be gravely affected? Do the health care professionals who perform such tests have
a duty (or even a right or privilege) to warn a patient's relatives of genetic risks
they discover? If a test reveals that someone may develop a serious disease because
of a genetic condition, is there more than a 'minimal risk' so that weightier duties
of disclosure and consent apply? To what extent should parents be allowed to
consent to genetic testing for their minor children? To what extent should tests
be encouraged when many of them are of limited use or accuracy, or may disclose
conditions for which no remedies exist? 130
Clearly, some strategic thinking is necessary ifwe are to anticipate and avoid
serious moral quagmires and legal inconsistencies regarding genetic technologies
and individual and family rights. Yet it seems premature and unwise to enact overly
broad legal restrictions before the full ramifications and potential benefits and
detriments of the evolving technologies are realistically understood and rationally
considered. The clash between potential medical benefits to individuals and
potential moral and ethical harms to society is significant, and both sides promote
values that are important to the quality of life in any society in which caring and
responsible human beings would care to live. There are no 'easy answers' to these
difficult issues, and we should beware of the Kelsean illusion that law-making
is a panacea for these profound scientific and moral dilemmas.

2

Reflections About Artificial Reproduction Developments in American Law

In many respects, the new reproductive techniques seem to pose no particular
difficulties for American family law. These techniques are generally used by married
couples to produce children who are biologically related to both parents. On the
other hand, these same techniques obviously have considerable potential to make
it easier for the unmarried to reproduce and can create situations in which the
identity of the parents is disputable.
By themselves, the use of these new reproductive techniques may not be
greatly consequential. What may make them so, however, is the way they fit with
other developments in family law. American family law is currently going through
what might be called a process of rationalization. That is, family law is increasingly
parsing, probing, and eroding the social institutions and assumptions which give
rise to the deep-seated sense of obligation which is necessary to restrain people's
destructive impulses in social living. The wind driving this erosion is the tendency

130

Reilly, supra at 16; Paul, infra at 214 (false positives in tests for PKU outnumbered true positives
32:1 in some circumstances).

83

Carl E. Schneider and Lynn D. Wardle

of family law to subject those institutions and assumptions to a very rationalistic
kind of scrutiny.
The conventional response of American legal scholars and many American
courts to the new reproductive techniques may be seen as part of this process of
rationalization. These novel bio-medical developments lead us to re-examine
intimate social relations and to make new distinctions among them, distinctions
which eat away at the kind of automatic and ingrained sense of duty which leads
people to behave well in family life. They create a class of 'mothers' who must
not care for the children they have borne and of 'fathers' who need not support
and may not raise the offspring they have sired. They ask us, in some of their
incarnations, to separate procreation from parental obligation. It is this aspect of
the new techniques which may ultimately pose the greatest challenge to American
family law.
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Summary of

Genetics and Artificial Procreation in the U.S.A.
by
Professor Carl E. Schneider and Professor Lynn D. Wardle
American law and practice regarding genetic, artificial reproduction and family
law are extraordinarily various and dynamic for many reasons. American
government remains in important ways genuinely federal and family law has
traditionally been confided to the fifty state governments, each of which is largely
free to regulate reproductive technologies as it wishes. American government also
remains committed to the principle of separation of powers, which means that the
power to regulate those technologies is divided among the various branches and
agencies of the federal and the state governments. Americans have a strong streak
of independence and a traditional dislike for centralized government regulation.
The common law approach that prefers a gradual rather than a pre-emptive legal
response to novel social problems is well-established in the American legal culture.
A powerful 'individual rights' ideology also restrains government law making in
the area of genetics and artificial reproduction.
Medical law in the United States of America generally rests upon three
fundamental principles. Patient autonomy is protected by individual consent and
privacy rules. Public welfare is of special concern regarding human experimentation
and public health epidemics. Professional competence is regulated in large part
by rules of liability for medical malpractice.
The United States has generally been more reluctant than many other
industrialized countries to enter into the kind of treaties that affect family law,
biomedicine, and human rights. The reasons for this are numerous, complex, and
controversial, but the constitutional structure of government and traditional
insularity are among the key influences.
American public policy toward genetic engineering is influenced by five
general tendencies of American public policy. First, public policy is ordinarily
more centrally concerned for the individual than the group. Second, liberty
frequently takes priority over social welfare. Third, innovation and progress are
commonly valued more intensely than conformity. Fourth, research is often driven
by the market, and regulations are often influenced by companies and people with
financial and personal interests in them. Fifth, public policy is likely to develop
case by case rather than through the early and centralized establishment of general
regulations. Genetic discrimination and genetic privacy are two policy concerns
that color many genetic policy disputes. Genetic screening, medical confidentiality,
and moral concerns about erosion of respect for human life and diminution of
personal responsibility are current issues.
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The speed with which new technologies are developing, the entrepreneurial
sprit of American medicine, and the absence of a national health system are among
the major influences upon artificial procreation policies. For most persons,
parentage is established by three presumptions - the presumption of the maternity
of the woman who gave birth to a child, the presumption of the paternity of her
husband, if she is married, and the presumption of paternity by open acknowledgment or cohabitation if she is not. Because they may create situations which
defy the procreative assumptions upon which these legal presumptions are based,
many parentage controversies have arisen recently involving artificial procreation.
Surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, embryo status, posthumous reproduction, and
human cloning are current issues.
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